Re: Question
Date: June 19, 2008 03:46PM
WPA-Personal has the AP and a crypto exchange. WPA-Enteprise has... well... somebody please explain it because I don't feel like spending the next half hour reading about it and the following ten minutes writing about it.
Also - No, WPA2-Personal can in many cases be made to not use a shared-key. Using a shared-key would be stupid, I agree. For example, HostAP can configure per-MAC (i.e. per-client) PSK's using a specifically configured /etc/hostapd.conf file for this purpose.
Many commercially available or COTS access-point hardware also supports this functionality for WPA2-Personal.
PEAP also has specific attacks against it. Windows XP SP0,SP1,SP2 all are vulnerable to a wireless "auto configuration weakness", and thus any KARMA or other complex evil-twin attacks. This can absolutely result in compromise, which could easily result in the compromise of a EAP-TLS certificate, or well... anything. RADIUS, LDAP, and AD have now just opened your server-side surface area to huge proportions. There are many integer/heap BO vulnerabilities that could be discovered, say, on-the-fly with regards to these protocols. They are not to be considered safe by any measure of the term.
Only Windows Vista, Windows XP SP3, and Windows XP SP2 with the specific Wireless Client Update address the auto configuration weakness.
There are other, less known attacks that have not even been talked about publicly with regards to WPA-Enteprise. For example, if you happen to be connected to wiredside and wireless at the same time, there are ways of controlling DNS or other network protocols from one side to the other, without even associating to the wireless network (which could include RADIUS, LDAP, etc).